Funding Request: Polymarket CLOB Liquidity Mining Program

[mshrieve]

Project
Polymarket

Proposers
Jared Kehlmann, Market Curator & Community Manager
Mike Shrieve, Protocol Lead

Emails
jared@polymarket.com
mike@polymarket.com

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Summary
Proposal to provide $UMA-denominated liquidity mining rewards on Polymarket to bootstrap its new Order Book and to devote engineering resources towards Order Book supporting products and tooling, based on the performance of key performance indicators over the course of the original liquidity mining program, on-going from May 2022.

Polymarket has been the most successful UMA integration partner and grant recipient, and has been responsible for 97% of all Optimistic Oracle requests. (Including 99.02% on V2 – source: https://dune.com/loset/uma-proposer-data.

Additionally, Polymarket’s UMA integration has spurred growth in the UMA community and user base, increasing the rate of UMA Oracle usage by multiple orders of magnitude, and clearly demonstrating UMA’s indisputable product-market fit. The initial grant was efficiently allocated to incentivize liquidity, and has lasted over three times longer than initially expected. UMA is the most critical integration for Polymarket, and Polymarket is UMA’s marquee application. The partnership has proven to be symbiotic.

Polymarket now requests 1,250,000 $UMA from the UMA DAO to allocate towards growing Polymarket’s new Order Book. Polymarket will use the $UMA grant to bootstrap liquidity on the Order Book and to invest in engineering resources dedicated to improving the user experience for market makers and traders alike. These deliverables are designed to accelerate the usage and adoption of the Order Book and to induce a strong network effect, which in turn will lead to exponential increases in UMA’s TVL, value secured, user base, and number of markets resolved by the Optimistic Oracle.

We acknowledge this is a significant request, but given the importance of Polymarket to UMA, being responsible for 97% of all requests, and Polymarket’s relationship with UMA for over a year, we believe it is within UMA DAO’s interest to invest treasury tokens in the adoption and growth of Polymarket’s new market structure. We’re confident it will create significantly more value for $UMA stakeholders than what is being expended.

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Description
The partnership between Polymarket and UMA, on-going for over a year, has proven instrumental to the continued growth and success of both protocols. UMA’s Optimistic Oracle provides a dependable, decentralized resolution source for Polymarket, with over 3,500 markets resolved by UMA to date. In turn, UMA proposers reap the rewards available to oracle proposers, the Optimistic Oracle and greater UMA protocol continues to be battle-tested, and the UMA community sees an influx of informed proposers and DAO participants from the Polymarket community. Additionally, Polymarket has developed and open-sourced two key integrations with the Optimistic Oracle: the original UmaCtfAdapter, deployed in January 2022, and the UmaCtfAdapterV2, deployed in October 2022 and pioneering the use of UMA’s event-based OptimisticOracleV2. Polymarket requests comprise 99.02% of all OptimisticOracleV2 requests.

In February 2022, Risk Labs granted 100,000 $UMA to Polymarket to fund a 10-week rewards “pilot” program. The program was a success, and, in May 2022, Polymarket successfully submitted a proposal to the UMA DAO to receive a 160,000 $UMA to be distributed over an estimated 12-week period. Polymarket has been exceptionally frugal with the grant, consistently iterating on their rewards methodology to get the best return on investment while minimizing the rate of $UMA distribution: Polymarket still has 12,000 of the 160,000 obtained from the DAO, and the liquidity program has been on-going for 54 weeks.

Over the duration of the program, 246,300 $UMA has been paid to 971 unique addresses, with a dollar value of $704,418 at a price of $2.86 ($UMA price on 3/16/23 of $2.20 + 30% premium). Over the same period, Polymarket has paid out $635,383 USDC as USDC-denominated rewards. Additionally, the majority of UMA proposers were introduced to the ecosystem via their $UMA exposure from using Polymarket.

Formerly, rewards were distributed to providers of liquidity to Polymarket AMM pools. Due to the nature of binary conditional tokens and impermanent loss, very active and informed management of positions is required to profitably LP in these pools. To increase liquidity in the markets and improve the user experience for both traders and liquidity providers, in December 2022, Polymarket launched its non-custodial, central limit order book trading system, or CLOB. The CLOB allows market makers to much more efficiently provide liquidity, decreasing their risk and overall capital costs, while improving the trading experience through decreased price impact, and increasing volumes and open interest. As users grow more comfortable with the CLOB, and Polymarket-provided tooling improves, Polymarket expects open interest and volumes to surpass the all-time highs by an order of magnitude. In the 2 months since launch, Polymarket has already seen success with modest $UMA-denominated liquidity rewards, which have led to 1-2 cent spreads on exotic, UMA-secured markets, and the onboarding of 338 unique market makers. You can find the rewards methodology here: https://polymarket.github.io/slate-docs/#incentives.

The CLOB is still in its early stages, and to kickstart the marketplace dynamics uniquely enabled by CLOB-traded markets, Polymarket seeks to distribute $UMA rewards to providers of actively managed liquidity on CLOB-traded markets. With the AMM, there is an inherently high risk of impermanent loss when LPing inversely correlated token pairs, as is the case with conditional tokens in binary markets. Nonetheless, with relatively small liquidity incentives per market, Polymarket was consistently able to attract moderate levels of liquidity. With the CLOB, the risk of impermanent loss no longer exists; instead, there is a path toward sustainable, organic liquidity, even for thinly traded markets. As such, the effect of liquidity incentives on liquidity available to traders and overall volume is amplified. Market makers are encouraged to develop strategies that will allow them to serve early trader demand and efficiently market make in the nascent CLOB-based Polymarket ecosystem.

The CLOB’s increased capital efficiency allows a massive expansion in the total number of markets available, which is also enabled by the multi-faceted capabilities of UMA’s Optimistic Oracle. On the roadmap are recurring markets: auto-deployed markets which resolve regularly. Incentivizing a network effect around these markets will lead to consistent, reliable requests to the Optimistic Oracle, increasing the total daily rewards paid to UMA proposers and boosting the overall volume and value locked by the Oracle. In addition, the UMA proposer community will continue to grow more skilled as proposers and disputers as more diverse market types are supported.

Polymarket strongly believes that a rewards program dedicated to the CLOB will benefit both parties. Polymarket has established a strong methodology and is rapidly iterating to improve efficiency and effectiveness. This proposal comes at a key moment in the expansion of total markets, liquidity, volume, and open interest.

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KPIs
View UMA x Polymarket Analytics on Dune at https://dune.com/loset/uma-proposer-data.

• All-time 3,554 requests from Polymarket out of 3,664 total UMA requests (97% Polymarket)
• ~3,500 markets successfully resolved with the Optimistic Oracle.
• $84,095 USDC Optimistic Oracle rewards paid to UMA proposers
• 9 all-time proposers in the UMA Oracle system prior to Polymarket’s integration, now 54.
• ~1,000 unique $UMA recipients

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Deliverables

• Provision of liquidity incentives for market makers in CLOB-based Polymarket markets according to the methodology outlined here: https://polymarket.github.io/slate-docs/#incentives.
• Development of products and tooling to support the Order Book: improving the user experience from trading to redemption, and allowing market makers to more effectively manage their positions.

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Total Budget Requested
1,250,000 $UMA
Wallet Address: 0x8cBefc47656eCb2e9E2cb89731283CC1e8cD7f4E

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Team
Polymarket is a leading decentralized finance (DeFi) project, with a global, technical team. It is the largest decentralized prediction markets platform in the world by volume.

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Poll

Do you support moving forward with this proposal?

• Yes
• No

[Steady-Edie]

if UMA is serious about using their treasury to grow the project and support projects building on this it’s an absolute no brainer.

Polymarket is one of the only legitmate DeFi apps that people actually use and Uma is lucky to have them tbh. Without Polymarket Uma is basically vaporware at this point so it makes a lot of sense both financially and for growth of the protocol.

[Conky]

I ain’t quite convinced that oracle requests be the proper way to gauge traction, particularly since UMA ain’t got no fee model, so we ain’t really able to determine which kind of traction is more precious. A solid case might be made for volume, and I reckon volume’s a finer measure. I’d wonder the market worth of each ended market over a specific time frame.

Across’, UMA’s grandest and top-performing integration, surpasses $1.5bn in volume over a year.

Polymarket ain’t sufficient to establish UMA, but offloading tokens on a down-in-the-dumps token is in snap area. If Polymarket was a Web3 initiative with its own coin then a swap or share deal might be involved and would be logical for UMA holders, as it’d boost their fundamental worth whilst shoving more tokens into the market. To sum up, UMA’s oracle requires more adoption, no question. Keepin’ polymarket liquid won’t resolve that problem, but releasin’ this quantity of tokens is difficult to stomach.

[poopster]

why does polymarket want to build on vaporware?

[Mhairi]

At 1.25m $UMA, this is an extremely high request - especially as it follows on from 2 previous periods of funding, one of 100k $UMA from Risk Labs and a further 160k $UMA from the UMA DAO under a revised proposal that initially requested 500k $UMA.

Discussions around UMA DAO support for Polymarket less than a year ago highlighted concerns that this may be the first of repeated requests, and there was reassurance that this was not the case, which gives pause around both the the scale and timing of the request, especially as in the previous discussion, one of the polymarket team noted that it was not sustainable for entities without a token to contribute incentives on the scale of a DAO.

As an UMA tokenholder, although I am keen to see our treasury be used to give support to nascent protocols built on the Optimistic Oracle, Polymarket’s notable volume and significant reputation in the space would suggest that it has reached a level of maturity where it can now explore alternative approaches.

I’m concerned that by supporting this proposal, UMA would be undermining Polymarket’s long term growth and by subsidising in this manner may even be perpetuating an organisational form which comes with regulatory risk in an increasingly hostile macro environment.

Like @Conky I’d be interested in exploring a token swap, were Polymarket looking at evolving into a DAO to enable sustainable incentivisation; build partnership between Polymarket and UMA DAO and cement Polymarket’s role as a leading prediction market in the Web3 space.

Note: posted in personal capacity as UMA tokenholder

[njess]

Dear Mike, Jared,
Thanks for your support of the UMA community and the proposal. Pleased you’ve put prior grants to good use

I agree UMA should try to support new projects on the platform - but I’d much rather see this amount of tokens split across 12 new teams who can bring fresh ideas and follow in Polymarket’s footsteps.

I’m particularly concerned at any proposal of size lumping together engineering and liquidity provision. Should dedicated liquidity providers appear, the UMA community could consider doing token loans or similar to match the capital that those liquidity providers put forward…easy to structure collateral with KPI options or similar.

An open question: have you tried to raise equity capital from your existing investors or new professional investors to support the new product launch?
From a quick look on crunchbase, it seems you are well connected to smart investors who would be in the business of backing notable progress–or certainly help you meet professional investors who might be better aligned to your success than grant $$.

Are you planning on launching a token to support and grow your ecosystem?

If you have very specific, tactical things, I’d recommend starting a different funding request (e.g. 50K matching liquidity) or similar – otherwise I’d respectfully suggest we try to direct this kind of proposal to the next wave of builders on the UMA ecosystem.

[mrice32]

Thanks for this detailed and thoughtful proposal, Jared and Mike.

First of all, I’m speaking purely in my capacity as an UMA token holder and community member. My opinions are only mine.

Polymarket is an important integration for the UMA DAO and is highly valued by the community. The integration has been extremely fruitful so far for both protocols.

However, I don’t agree with this proposal for the following reasons:

• I don’t think UMA tokens should be the primary mechanism for offering LM rewards on Polymarket. I think the UMA tokens should be secondary to LM rewards offered by Polymarket, either through a Polymarket token or USDC, as is done today. (Note: UMA tokens are not free, their value comes from existing and future holders of UMA tokens.) Up to now, this has not been true. The estimations in this proposal put the Polymarket funding just below the UMA funding so far, but I suspect that the true gap is much larger since many of those UMA rewards were paid out when the token price was multiples higher in USDC terms.
• The size is in the millions of dollars. If the DAO were to offer a grant to a protocol of that size, I think the DAO should be given some sort of stake or ownership in return, as it is the size of a check in a venture funding round. To be clear, I’m not actually suggesting this, it’s a comment on the size.
• The proposal says that some funds will be use to fund the development of Polymarket’s products and tooling. It’s not clear how the funds will be split between this and funding the LM. Since Polymarket is a venture-funded business with large investors behind it, I do not think the UMA DAO’s funds should be used for this purpose.
• Polymarket has received generous grants from the UMA DAO in the past. In a previous proposal, it was assured that the DAO would not be asked for tokens indefinitely. However, this proposal is larger than the previous proposals, at least in terms of the number of UMA tokens.

While I have disagreements with this proposal, I have a great deal of respect for the Polymarket team, product, and business. I appreciate the team’s thoughtfulness around this proposal, and I’m looking forward to hearing from other community members and UMA token holders about this proposal!

[Admin-UMA]

The result of the temp check was

• 15 voters
• 53% in favour
• 47% against.

The proposal will now go forward to a snapshot vote starting 23rd March

If the proposal achieves 51% of votes in the snapshot with a quorum of 5% of the circulating supply it will go forward to the UMA voter dapp for UMA tokenholders to vote on-chain.

[coachmcguirk]

Conky and Mhairi, both of you make strong points. I want to address a larger theme here.

First I want to make one thing clear. UMA is not vaporware; not anything close. It serves our use case of decentralized resolution of general-purpose prediction markets excellently. It’s the best solution in the market and is a zero-to-one innovation.

It seems the branding around UMA as a source of truth for on-chain requests about anything has become the predominant narrative, as per the new landing page, so to discredit requests to the oracle as a core metric, and instead favor volume (which has nothing to do with UMA’s value capture methods), seems misaligned.

And while Polymarket is 99% of UMA’s requests, it is also roughly 100% of generalized prediction market volume (not including sports). Most markets on Polymarket only exist on Polymarket, and these are UMA’s target market. This is after dozens of tried and failed PMs. So it’s not that we’re your only customer in this regard, we’re your largest target customer in general.

We believe we are on a path to exponential growth and to reach new ATHs. And with continued exponential growth (which we have this year so far), the ability for users to create their own markets, and increased volume, this is about as good of a shot that UMA has for widespread adoption as any. We’ve already seen the dynamics wherein the Polymarket community learns all about UMA when there are disputes; that will continue to amplify and drive awareness and value to UMA. The problem we need to solve for is that we have no aligned upside with the DAO despite there being 33% of UMA tokens earmarked for ecosystem growth, while you guys stand to benefit immensely from our growth. The ability for us to align incentives here is one of the core pillars of Web3 and is baked into the architecture of the UMA DAO itself. We are the monopoly and largest player in your target market and nearly 100% of your activity; we feel we’re starting to really take off, and it makes sense to align incentives. The idea of some sort of token swap is interesting and could potentially make sense in some form too.

NJess, to address your comment. It looks like you’ve been advising UMA since January 2018, that’s 5.25 years. Where are these 12 other projects that are going to drive more growth than Polymarket? We’re 5 years in and Polymarket is the largest and only legitimate independent customer (the others are spin-outs from the same team and entity). There have been no other independent projects that have requested grants in years. But that’s not even what’s worrisome about your comment and the business logic that underlies it.

“I’d much rather see this amount of tokens split across 12 new teams who can bring fresh ideas”. Beyond dismissing your largest customer after 5 years of operating as if they’re less valuable and less capable of innovating than 12 “new teams” eager to build on UMA that don’t exist currently and haven’t shown up in the past years, the real problem is that you’re viewing this as a zero-sum game when it’s not; these 2 things are not mutually exclusive. There are ~33% of tokens earmarked for ecosystem growth that remain largely untouched. This proposal is for ~1%. If you were able to find 12 new promising teams, which seems unrealistic in the near term based on the absence of recent proposals, the DAO would have a budget in excess of an order of magnitude (>10x) higher than what it would take to both approve this grant to Polymarket and the 12 new teams with better, “fresh ideas”. And I do agree that it is in the UMA DAO’s interest to give grants to those 12 teams when they show up as well. But you’re taking something positive sum, that is baked into the protocol, and labeling it as zero or negative sum. And leaning into pipedreams instead of into the strong PMF that already exists for UMA. I believe in optimistic thinking too, but it’s not either-or, and if you can only choose one, the concrete strong PMF is objectively the better route. It seems like the UMA team deeply understands this given their brand repositioning to lean into their best use case and strongest PMF.

Bottom line:

If you have 33% of your tokens earmarked for ecosystem growth, and you’re not going to align with your largest and only customer after years when they’re the largest driver of fundamental value for you, what are you going to use it for? We think we are poised to grow a lot, and in doing so drive significant value to our oracle solution, which we intend to be UMA, and we want aligned incentives in that regard. We have zero upside in your success, you guys have aligned incentives with our success: let’s come up with a solution to align incentives.

[coachmcguirk]

FWIW, I’d much rather get a response and collaborate on a proposal that we have alignment on than let this go to snapshot today.

[somedao]

Polymarket doesn’t pay UMA, despite labeling themselves a “customer”. Polymarket has requested massive amounts of funding from the UMA DAO over and over. It is almost like Polymarket is asking for UMA to pay them to use UMA.

UMA should not give any more tokens to Polymarket, as they don’t seem to appreciate previous funding from UMA and will always request more. Who knows if they will continue using UMA once they can no longer use UMA for funding.

[Admin-UMA]

Note that following a request from Polymarket the snapshot vote has been postponed to allow more time for discussion.

[L-Kov]

I echo the motivation outlined by Coach in his post above. I also want to offer some further context and clarification to statements made in this thread so far. First, I want to point to Arbitrum’s recent airdrop as a relevant comparison for token grants from platforms to integrating projects. Arbitrum recognized the importance of DAOs and the communities they represent and thus airdropped tokens directly to these DAOs with the plan to distribute additional tokens to projects via grant proposals. Arbitrum’s primary motivation for airdropping tokens to DAOs was “the localization of community governance”, a goal I think the UMA DAO also shares. Polymarket’s liquidity mining program has been tremendously successful in distributing UMA to a “subcommunity” which has further strengthened the UMA oracle. A continuation of the liquidity mining program will continue to broaden the UMA community.

I mention this comparison to Arbitrum as an aside to the explicitly stated goal of “encourage[ing] protocol growth” for which the ~35M UMA development fund has been earmarked. The plan since 2020 has been to release tokens “as they are judged to be well spent to grow the protocol”. To this, I affirm Coach’s comments; granting a small piece of this ecosystem growth fund to a project as promising and established as Polymarket is $UMA well spent.

Finally, I want to directly respond to @mhari where she cites that there was reassurance made in the previously accepted proposal that it was “not [going to be] the first of repeated requests”. The brief summary of the referenced proposal summarized the request as “liquidity mining rewards on Polymarket for 12 weeks with consideration for a longer extension”. The door was always left open due to the anticipation of potential success. The skepticism that the previous proposals were met with has been quelled. At this point Polymarket has sustainable product-market-fit without artificial incentives in large part due to it’s new CLOB which was referenced as a key development goal under which Polymarket should be evaluated for future proposals. The additional UMA will be focused on super charging growth of Polymarket now that a sustainable foundation has been established. This growth-focused mindset is the exact stated goal of the UMA-ecosystem treasury. Polymarket was also extremely responsible in the management of the original grant, adjusting distribution based on development timelines, growth, market factors etc.

In summary, Polymarket has proven results to the UMA-DAO and deserves consideration for an additional, larger, UMA-ecosystem grant which will come at a pivotal inflection point in Polymarket’s growth trajectory. Ultimately, I am confident that this grant will be regarded as extremely symbiotic.

[Clayton]

Being posted as Clayton, the UMA tokenholder. I work at Risk Labs as the head of comms and community for Across and UMA – and I haven’t discussed this with any of my teammates ahead of time. My ask is that anyone who wants to comment on this to me do so here, for the fairness of everyone involved, and not in any private communications.

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Do prediction markets have enough PMF to go big today? if they do, and if UMA is interested in this vertical (it is) – Then I think we need to be asking ourselves how do we get the industry from 0 to 1 in terms of hacking this liquidity problem.

On observation I think is relevant here is that liquidity provision is not really site-exclusive. So long as markets are the same, you can expect people to cross-market-make with a small profit built in.

UMA ran developer mining years ago and it was just farmed. Rumor is that some of Polymarket’s is farmed too, with people botting markets each hour to capture the ‘create market reward,’ and liquidity provision that eliminates risk and thus doesn’t offer useful liquidity. This is second-hand information, open to being corrected.

This can be true alongside it also genuinely createing market liquidity, it’s just a really hard problem to solve. But we do have a tool in our toolbox for this sort of thing: competition.

To me, the only world where UMA subsidizing more liquidity for a prediction market is one where it does two things:

1- Offers to incentivize liquidity on any prediction market, with the added benefit of encouraging more prediction markets to onboard to UMA resolution and

2- Creates a competitive landscape that helps ensure the rewards are used optimally.

As for how to measure which site is using the rewards optimally, I don’t know the right answer here. Some metric that is a proxy for actual adoption – Genuine market volume, for example.

If there is support for this, I’d appeal to Risk Labs to effectively “match” any effort put forth by the author or any other interested party for some initial feasibility discussion.

[Britt]

I’m posting this in my capacity as an $UMA token holder after a community call today where we had a chance to discuss this proposal with the Polymarket team. These thoughts are my own.

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I do believe that Polymarket has gone through a significant growth period since its previous round of funding from UMA, and I can understand why they’d like to utilize LM incentives to achieve some explosive growth in the short-term future.

There are a couple of things that would make me feel more comfortable with any sizeable grant request, solely based on some of my observations in the Defi governance space. I’d like to invite the Polymarket team to incorporate any of these elements into their proposal.

1. Vesting - Any grant designed to last for longer than 3 months should be distributed on a vesting schedule with the option to revoke via the same mechanism by which it was approved. I want to encourage Polymarket to build in the way that will lead to the most success for them because this also leads to success for UMA. However, when we move fast and break things we should take some precautionary steps to protect the interests of the DAO. If any part of these funds were to be misused, I’d like the DAO to be able to retain the ability to withhold any remaining portion of the grant.

2. Detailed utilization plans - It seems there was a little bit more room for specific details around how the funds would be used. I would also like to better understand this.

3. Path to profitability - While I do want to support Polymarket in finding success, I want to see more articulation on this front from the team. I want to better understand Polymarket’s roadmap with realistic expectations on how the protocol can sustainably attract enough liquidity to become profitable.

4. Efforts to support the purpose of $UMA - As an $UMA token holder, I want to see $UMA make it into the hands of those who will participate in our oracle. I specifically don’t want to see $UMA being used to incentivize LM for users who are going to dump the token. My concern isn’t token price, but it is token value in the sense that voting is valuable. I’d like to see an effort from the Polymarket team to prevent this in some way. While I understand that there’s no way to definitely prevent it, I do think there are some efforts that could be used to demonstrate that there is an alignment on the importance of voting in UMA. Examples of this might be:

• Content featuring UMA with a discussion on the importance of voting
• An analysis of what Polymarket $UMA recipients do with those tokens (This is huge for me! If you could demonstrate what % of staked and voting $UMA originates in PM, that would be really valuable to me).

I’m looking forward to continuing this discussion and appreciate the Polymarket team taking some time to come talk with us today.

[coachmcguirk]

Hey @Britt. We appreciate the constructive nature of your reply and enjoyed getting some of the guys in front of the community last week. Our position has been and remains that this grant should be symbiotic and we are willing to make changes to the original proposal to get something across the finish line. I will address your specific points below.

Vesting - We are open to a vesting structure or some creative distribution schedule. Our only hesitation is that it ends up creating significantly more work (upfront and recurring) which creates a distraction to our focus of building a world-changing prediction market. We believe we demonstrated with the last grant a high level of responsibility in regard to fund management (slowing down distribution, adjusting to timelines, iterating on methodology quickly to maximize efficiency) albeit with a significantly smaller grant.

Utilization Plans - We will commit to using 100% of the granted funds in our liquidity mining and incentivization programs. 100% of the funds will be distributed to market participants on Polymarket. The program and its current methodology is outlined in detail in our docs and in this blog post. In its current form, the program rewards users that place resting limit orders on specific markets. It borrows heavily from the supply-side methodologies of dYdX’s and Blur’s successful liquidity mining rewards programs. We have and continue to iterate on the methodology to increase efficiency and catalyze specific activities, so the equations and strategies will be subject to change which we believe is in the interest of the UMA DAO as well.

Path to profitability - Polymarket will take fees on trading at some point. The exact fee schedule is not yet decided, but the fee mechanic is built into the underlying exchange smart contract and outlined in the documentation here. There are also other routes of profitability/sustainability that we are looking at, many of which are tried and tested for a product of our type. If we can continue to build on the success of the last month, it’s very likely we can operate profitably.

Efforts to support the purpose of $UMA - We agree this makes sense as a core consideration of the UMA DAO. We believe that Polymarket already converts a lot of users into UMA voters and community participants, but we have plans to do more - specifically on the product side. Soon, we will be adding more details to each market about where it is in the request/propose/settle lifecycle with links to the UMA OO page and DVM votes. By making users more aware of this process we assume more will become involved. We would also be open to working with the UMA team and community on publishing longer-form content on our new Mirror blog. We have a few of our own UMA-resolution-focused pieces in the pipeline already. We would also be open to working on an analysis of what % of staked and voting UMA originated from Polymarket distribution. We’ve looked at it in some detail and decided that it was impossible to get an accurate figure due to the amount of wallet changes that happen as users move their UMA to Ethereum from Polygon (and in the initial claim process). With that said, we could supply more detail into our work on this front and collaborate on a longer-term strategy to evaluate this metric. Empirically speaking, we know that the vast majority of Polymarket-related OO requests come from Polymarket users, which means that the vast majority of all OO requests are from Polymarket users. A number of the largest Polymarket users actively participate in UMA as stakers and voters (though they are still relatively small given we’ve distributed <0.2% of UMA to date.

We’re confident that this proposal will be a net positive for everyone involved, and, as discussed, we’re happy to collaborate on measures that can be taken to assure you of that. How should we best move forward? Perhaps it’s best that UMA token holders share their thoughts on the terms we’ve proposed here to help us better understand what would comprise a proposal everyone can feel excited about. Thanks again for your enthusiasm to engage in this dialogue.

[kevin]

Just want to make sure people saw the proposal I posted last week with regards to this funding request. Would love some feedback. Have a look here:

Partnership Proposal: UMA <> Polymarket

This proposal is in response to the recent Polymarket Funding Request and some of the concerns expressed in comments. Please review that proposed funding request for full context on this partnership proposal. Polymarket and UMA have a long and productive history of building together. The recent Polymarket funding proposal makes a request of 1.25mm UMA tokens to help bootstrap liquidity incentives on Polymarket’s new CLOB Order Book. Some UMA community members are concerned with the size of the …